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Abstract
Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities has become an integral element in the reg-
ulation of network industries and has been implemented in many jurisdictions. The idea
of separating the network, as the natural monopoly, from downstream retailing, which may
be exposed to competition, is still subject to contentious debate. This is because there is
much empirical evidence that unbundling eliminates economies of vertical integration while
empirical evidence on price reducing effects is still lacking. In this paper we study the effect
of legal unbundling on grid charges in the German electricity distribution industry. Using
panel data on German distribution system operators (DSOs) we exploit the variation in the
timing of the implementation of legal unbundling and the fact that not all DSOs had to
implement unbundling measures. We are also able to identify heterogeneous effects of legal
unbundling for different types of price regulation, because we observe a switch in the price
regulation regime from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation during our observa-
tion period. Our findings suggest that legal unbundling of the network stage significantly
decreases grid charges in the range of 5% to 9%, depending on the type of price regulation
in place.
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1 Introduction
Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities (VIU) has become a major instrument when it
comes to the regulation of network industries. Given that the network represents an essential
input for downstream retailers, VIUs may have incentives to discriminate the network access
against retail competitors by setting high grid charges, while the VIUs themselves can cross-
subsidize these costs. Thus, unbundling of the network stage intends to limit the incentives
for discrimination of the former VIU and to foster competition in the retail segment. Despite
its potential benefits, unbundling remains a controversial topic. The reason is that it causes a
loss of vertical economies of scope while evidence on whether its potential benefits e.g. lower
pricesas lower materialize in practice is still lacking.
In the past two decades, the regulatory principle of vertical divestiture in combination with
third party access has been applied in a variety of forms in many infrastructure industries,
especially in electricity markets, around the globe. For instance, the European Union requires
legal unbundling of the electricity and gas distribution networks for VIUs with more than
100,000 customers.1 The unbundled distribution system operator (DSO) must be independent
with respect to its legal form, organization, and decision making from other activities not related
to distribution (CEER, 2013). Ownership unbundling of the electricity and gas transmission
network has been compulsory for EU Member States since the Third Energy Package came
into force in 2009. Not only in Europe but also in the US, unbundling is widely applied in the
electricity and natural gas industries (Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz, 2011b). Besides in energy markets,
vertical unbundling is also practiced in many other infrastructure markets such as railway
transportation (van de Velde, 2015; Finger, 2014), telecommunications (Bourreau and Dogˇan,
2005; Pindyck, 2007), and internet broadband (Nardotto et al., 2015).
However, despite its wide application and now more than one decade of experience with
unbundling measures in many industries, empirical evidence on its competition fostering effects
is still scarce. Moreover, there is a body of empirical literature highlighting that unbundling
may lead to the loss of vertical economies, which particularly deals with ownership unbundling
(see, e.g., Arocena et al., 2012; Gugler et al., 2017; Triebs et al., 2016, for recent contributions).
Also, economic theory suggests that unbundling may lead to reduced investments in the network
in order to increase equilibrium prices (e.g. Buehler et al., 2004; Cremer et al., 2006; Gugler
1Electricity Directives 2003/54/EC, 2009/72/EC, and Gas Directives Directive Directive 2003/55/EC,
2009/73/EC.
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et al., 2013). Because of these two counteracting affects – ambigous effects on prices on the
one hand and a loss of vertical economies on the other – there is still a controversial debate
among scholars and policy-makers about the costs and benefits of unbundling. For example,
Japan’s announcement in 2015 to legally unbundle its electricity transmission and distribution
sector by April 2020 has received much media attention, in which the unpredictable effects are
often criticized.2 However, some theoretical papers argue that legal unbundling may serve as a
‘golden mean’ between full ownership unbundling and vertical integration as it minimizes the
loss in vertical economies but is supposed to be similarly effective in fostering competition (see,
e.g. Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz, 2011b). But again, empirical evidence is lacking and it is frequently
questioned if LU is actually effective in fostering downstream competition.
To reduce this void in the literature, we study the competitive effect of legal unbundling in
the German electricity distribution industry on grid charges. We make use of the fact that VIUs
with more than 100,000 customers had to legally unbundle, while utilities below this threshold
have been allowed to stay vertically integrated. Moreover, we have additional variation in the
implementation of unbundling measures as not all DSOs implemented legal unbundling in the
same year. A key feature is our exhaustive panel dataset on grid charges and firm and network
characteristics of German DSOs. The sample period 2005–2014 covers the unbundling transition
of several DSOs. In addition, our sample covers an important regulatory change, a switch from
rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation. Hence, we test the effect of legal unbundling
on grid charges under different types of price regulation using a triple-differences approach.
Another feature of our paper is that we are able to match DSOs with the generation capacity of
intermittent renewable energy sources connected to their grid. The connection of decentralized
solar and wind plants poses a new challenge to DSOs and may significantly drive their costs.
We find that the implementation of legal unbundling leads to a decrease in distribution grid
charges in the range of 5% to 9%, depending on the on the type of price regulation. During
rate-of-return regulation, firms subject to legal unbundling set around 5% lower prices. After
2009, when incentive regulation was introduced in the German electricity distribution sector,
legally unbundled firms charge even 9% lower prices than vertically integrated utilitities. The
results remain robust in several robustness checks, such as Lewbel (2012)’s heteroskedasticity-
based instrumental variables approach, split sample analyses, dropping DSOs that unbundled
2For critical reactions, see e.g.: IEEE Spectrum, March 30, 2016: “Consequences of Japan’s Energy Market
Reforms Not Easy to Predict”, site access on October 5, 2018.
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voluntarily, as well as running placebo tests.
To sum up, our results show that legal unbundling is indeed effective in reducing grid charges.
However, the results also suggest that the magnitude of the price reducing effect depends on the
price regulation regime in place and is significantly more pronounced under incentive regulation
than under rate-of-return regulation. From this perspective, our results are ‘good news’ to many
jurisdictions that already apply legal unbundling in combination with incentive regulation. For
example, this combinations applies to electricity and gas distribution markets in most EU
Member States and in many States of the USA. For Japan, currently planning to introduce
legal unbundling, our results may be promising.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background knowl-
edge about the German electricity sector and its regulatory reforms and Section 3 provides an
overview of the relevant literature. Our data are presented in Section 4 and our identification
strategy and the results in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and provides conclusions.
2 Industry Background
The electricity supply chain can be briefly segregated into generation, high-voltage supra-
regional transmission, lower-voltage local distribution, and downstream retail. In Germany,
electricity generation is divided between four major electricity utilities (i.e. RWE, EnBW,
E.ON, Vattenfall) operating the vast majority of generation capacity, and several local pro-
ducers as well as foreign companies.3 However, the historically high market concentration of
the four big players has decreased in recent years, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, as a po-
litical consequence to the nuclear plant accident in Fukushima in 2011, six gigawatt of their
nuclear generation capacity was shut-down. Secondly, a strongly growing deployment of gener-
ation capacity from decentralized RES in Germany reduces the share of conventional electricity
generation capacity.4
Germany is subdivided into four transmission grid areas operated by 50 Hertz Transmission,
TransnetBW, Amprion and TenneT TSO. These transmission grid operators (TSOs) emerged
from the ownership unbundling of the four major German electricity utilities.5 Electricity
3According to the special reports 59 and 71 of the German Monopoly Commission (2011, 2015), the Big Four
covered 82 percent of the overall electricity generation capacity in 2009 and 62 percent of the nuclear power and
fossil fuels electricity generation capacity in 2014.
4Electricity generation from renewable energies such as wind and solar is heavily subsidized by the Renewable
Energy Act (in German: “Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz” (EEG)).
550 Hertz from Vattenfall, TransnetBW from EnBW, Amprion from RWE and TenneT from E.ON.
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distribution is divided between approximately 880 local DSOs (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). As a
result of the high (sunk) costs of building a new electricity grid, competition cannot emerge in
this sector. For historical reasons, DSOs are typically part of a vertically integrated utility, which
bears the incentive for price discrimination and to exercise non-price discriminatory measures
against downstream retail competitors.
To prevent excessively high grid charges, the grid charges were subject to a rate-of-return
regulation, which was replaced by an incentive regulation in 2009.6 Both regulations involved
the prohibition of price discrimination between similar customers and included revenue caps
set by the Federal Network Agency. Thus, grid charges are essentially determined by the
annual revenue caps, which are set by the regulatory authority at the beginning of each five-
year regulatory period.7 However, the setting of the cap differs fundamentally between the
two regulatory regimes. Under rate-of-return regulation, revenue caps were purely cost-based.
Hence, DSOs hardly had incentives to become more efficient because any investments or cost
changes related to the network operations were accounted for in the revenue cap and did not
change their rate of return.
This is in stark contrast to incentive regulation, in which the revenue caps are based on pro-
ductivity and efficiency estimations to simulate competitive pressure in the regulated industry.
The annual revenue cap under incentive regulation consists of two parts. The ‘general X-factor’
applies equally to all DSOs in the industry and essentially covers the productivity growth in the
regulated industry (Gugler and Liebensteiner, 2018). A second DSO-specific component is based
on the DSO’s (in)efficiency score as determined in a benchmarking process. The idea is that
inefficient DSOs get a lower revenue cap as a ‘motivation’ to become more efficient (i.e. to catch
up to the efficiency frontier). Also, in case of network investments or other unforeseen events,
DSOs have the right to claim an adjustment of their revenue cap at the regulatory agency.
Essentially, the individual revenue cap determines a DSO’s scope of price setting for access to
its distribution grid.8 A price set too high would result in a revenue above the revenue cap that
6A detailed description of the regulation of grid charges in Germany’s electricity distribution sector is pro-
vided by the Federal Network Regulation Agency: www.bundesnetzagentur.de/EN/Areas/Energy/Companies/
GeneralInformationOnEnergyRegulation/IncentiveRegulation/IncentiveRegulation_node.html, accessed
on September 27, 2018. Also, detailed information can be found in Hellwig et al. (2018).
7For the setting of the revenue cap, the regulatory agency examines a DSO’s costs for operating the grid,
as well as other costs that are not under the immediate control of the DSO (e.g. legal obligations, concession
fees, business taxes, upstream transmission charges, investments related to network operations, extra costs of
underground cabling, or collective agreements about nonwage and social benefits).
8Before a new grid charge enters into force, it has to be reported to the regulatory authority. The regulatory
authority then proves whether the grid charge accords with the legal framework, the non-discrimination policy,
and commits to a “fair price setting rule.”
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cannot be retained, while a low price might yield suboptimal profits (RAP, 2014).9 Thus, under
both regulatory regimes (rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation), utilities have scope
for setting their grid charges, although the revenue cap plays a central role.
With the 2005 novel of the German Energy Law (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG) the
EU Electricity Directives 2003/54/EC was transposed into national law which required DSOs
to legally unbundle from downstream retail. Legal unbundling, however, is only mandatory for
utilities with more than 100,000 customers. Only 45 of around 880 DSOs are large enough to fall
under legal unbundling requirements in Germany in 2015 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). Smaller
utilities are exempt from this regulation, as a result of the amount of structural changes required,
and are thus still allowed to remain vertically integrated. Although these small utilities have the
right to voluntarily legally unbundle, this rarely happens in practice, as outlined in more detail
in Section 4. Legal unbundling represents an intermediate approach between the extreme forms
of full vertical divestiture (ownership unbundling) and vertical integration. It forces vertically
integrated utilities to partition their distribution activities by creating a new legal entity. Using
this approach, the distribution grid can remain in the ownership of the integrated enterprise,
but it must be managed by a legally distinct DSO. Legal unbundling is thus intended to foster
downstream competition by strengthening the formal independence and self-responsibility of
the DSO but at the same time mantain the vertical economies as much as possible.
One argument for legal unbundling is that – in contrast to ownership unbundling – the
initially VIU may not lose its vertical economies to full extent. Furthermore, legal unbundling
is easier to implement in practice, because the unbundled DSO remains in the ownership of the
initially VIU.10 It is assumed that with full ownership unbundling, the new system operator
may be fully neutral against any downstream retailer. However, with legal unbundling the
integrated utility still possesses the network even though it must be managed by a legally
independent operator. Hence, it is possible that incentives to discriminate, such as setting high
grid charges to harm downstream competitors, may sustain with legal unbundling. It is thus
open to empirical investigation whether legal unbundling is indeed successful in reducing grid
charges compared to vertical integration.
9Obtained revenues above or below the actual revenue cap are transferred to a regulatory account and
transferred at the end of the regulatory period.
10Most transmission system operators (TSOs) in Europe are subject to ownership unbundling. One reason
may be that only few TSOs exist (usually one per country; four in Germany) so that ownership unbundling is
feasible, while with many DSOs (e.g. there are around 880 DSOs in Germany, of which around 45 are large
enough to fall under legal unbundling requirements; see also Section 4) the costs of ownership unbundling would
be tremendous.
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3 Literature
We now survey the literature on the different effects of unbundling in the energy sectors: on
grid charges, on investments, on retail prices, on economies of scope and on cost efficiency.
The only empirical paper we are aware of that (directly) examines the effect of unbundling
measures on grid charges itself is Nikogosian and Veith (2012). They analyze German DSOs
using cross-section data from August 2008 but do not find statistically significant effects of
required legal unbundling and of ownership unbundling on grid charges. However, they find
that voluntariliy unbundled DSOs charge higher prices. Although this paper is related to our
analysis, their results are likely to suffer from substantial unobserved heterogeneity between
DSOs due to the cross-sectional dimension of their dataset. In contrast, we make use of a panel
dataset and apply a difference-in-differences estimator with DSO fixed effects. Moreover, they
do not consider the fact that DSOs with less than 30.000 customers are subject to a different
type of price regulation.
In a theoretical setup, Cremer and Donder (2013) examine the effects of legal and ownership
unbundling on grid investments. They find that, under ownership unbundling, the unregulated
VIU limits its investments in grid capacity in order to increase equilibrium grid charges and
maximize its profits from the grid operation. With legal unbundling the upstream firm takes
downstream profits into account as well. Hence, given that downstream profits increase with
grid capacity, the upstream firms invest more in grid capacity under legal unbundling and grid
charges are lower. Similarly, Buehler et al. (2004) suggest that, under reasonable assumptions
on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under
vertical integration. The finding that ownership unbundling decreases investment is empirically
supported by Gugler et al. (2013) in their examination of grid investments in European countries.
Several other papers have examined the effect of unbundling on retail prices in the energy
sector . For the electricity sector, Steiner (2012) analysed a panel dataset of 19 OECD countries
for the period of 1987–1996. Using a random effects estimator she finds that unbundling of
generation and transmission had no significant effect on end-user prices. Sen and Jamasb
(2012) use panel data for 19 Indian states between 1991 and 2007 and assess the effect of several
regulatory variables on electricity prices for end-consumers and other variables. With respect
to unbundling measures they do not find a significant effect on consumer prices. However,
the paper does not provide any details on the type of unbundling. Nillesen and Pollitt (2011)
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investigate New Zealand’s introduction of ownership unbundling of distribution from retail in
1998. They conduct a before-and-after analysis and find that average end-consumer prices did
not change significantly after ownership unbundling, though residential prices increased and
commercial prices decreased. For the gas sector, Growitsch and Stronzik (2014) and Brau et al.
(2010) empirically analyze the effect of unbundling for a panel of EU countries. Both do not find
that ownership unbundling had a significant effect on consumer prices for natural gas. However,
Growitsch and Stronzik (2014) find that consumer prices were significantly reduced with legal
unbundling.
A larger strand of the literature on vertical separation focuses on the empirical measurement
of vertical economies, usually based on the estimation of a multi-output cost function, which are
assumed to be lost with unbundling (e.g. Arocena et al., 2012; Fetz and Filippini, 2010; Greer,
2008; Gugler et al., 2017; Triebs et al., 2016). These papers highlight that vertical integration
is associated with vertical synergies (e.g. coordination advantages, usage of common inputs and
staff, sharing of information and hedging against risk, avoidance of double marginalization) and
that successful unbundling has to outweigh the dissipated scope economies by its benefits (e.g.
lower retail prices through competition, avoidance of cross-subsidization, mitigation of sabotage
and discriminatory access in the network segment).
However, despite the costs increasing effect of unbundling due to the elimination of vertical
economies there are also papers suggesting that there may be a countervailing effect due to
an increase in cost efficiency. Using a cost function Nillesen and Pollitt (2011) analyze New
Zealand’s introduction of mandatory ownership unbundling of distribution from retail in 1998
and find that ownership unbundling has significantly reduced the unit-operation costs of elec-
tricity distribution and that grid quality (proxied by an electricity supply interruption index)
has improved. Similar to Nillesen and Pollitt (2011), Filippini and Wetzel (2014) find that
ownership unbundling improved the cost efficiency of New Zealand’s DSOs based on Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (which, in contrast to a standard cost function estimation, deals explicitly
with firms’ inefficiencies). A novel result is that the short-run efficiency improvement (evalu-
ated from a variable cost function) is higher than the long-run efficiency (evaluated from a total
cost function). Kwoka et al. (2010) derive efficiency scores of U.S. DSOs by data envelopment
analysis and then apply a difference-in-differences approach to infer about how unbundling
affects efficiency. The findings are that mandatory unbundling of the distribution grid from
upstream generation had a decremental effect on efficiency, while voluntary divestiture did not
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significantly distort efficiency. These findings are in line with Delmas and Tokat (2005) who find
that stronger integration leads to higher efficiency. A limitation of Kwoka et al.’s difference-
in-differences approach is that they do not provide any tests or evidence that the treatment
(unbundling) and control (no unbundling) groups are similar.
Summed up, the effects of unbundling remains ambiguos according to the current litera-
ture. Regarding the competition fostering effects of unbundling, the scarce empirical evidence
suggests that unbundling neither had a significant effect on grid charges nor on retail prices.
However, the existing studies all suffer from different non-neglibible weaknesses. Moreover, it is
not clear if the loss of vertical economies due to unbundling can be outweighed by an increased
cost efficiency. Also, most studies focus on the effects of ownership unbundling while the effects
of legal unbundling are clearly under-researched. This is suprising, especially against the back-
ground that legal unbundling represents the standard requirement in the energy sectors and
is considered as a ‘golden mean’ between full ownership unbundling and vertical integration.
(see, e.g. Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz, 2011b,a). Though the economies of vertical integration should be
less affected by legal unbundling than by full ownership unbundling, it is also not clear if legal
unbundling is still effective in reducing prices. Our paper naturally extends the literature by
investigating the latter.
4 Data
We construct a panel dataset for the period 2005–2014, which combines information on grid
charges and grid characteristics of German DSOs, renewable energy capacities connected to the
grid, and – of utmost importance for our purpose – the status of DSOs’ vertical integration. The
data stem from several sources. Data on grid charges and grid characteristics are obtained from
e’net, one of the largest private information service providers for Germany’s energy industry.
Data on all wind and solar plants, their capacities and their geographical location are gathered
from EnergyMap, a project by the German branch of the International Solar Energy Society
that combines and adjusts data on wind and solar capacities to the corresponding distribution
grid. The integration of wind and solar plants to the grid is a major cost component for the
DSOs, which is reflected in the grid charges. More renewables mean higher operational costs due
to an increase in volatile and often unpredictable electricity feed-in and also higher replacement
investments; more details follow below.
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Our main variable of interest is the status of vertical integration of the DSOs. Even though
legal unbundling became mandatory for all DSOs with more than 100,000 customers, there were
also cases where DSOs with less than 100,000 customers had to unbundle, for instance due to
holdings in other grid operators. To identify the status of vertical integration, we manually
skimmed the DSOs’ financial statements of the respective sample years for announcements
considering their form of unbundling as well as for information on their vertical structures, such
as (the absence of) electricity generation or retail activities. If a utility’s financial statement
indicated legal unbundling, the legal connection to its former retail and/or generation unit was
identified to double check the information contained in its financial statements. Furthermore,
we determined if legally unbundled DSOs had implemented legal unbundling voluntarily by
browsing their financial statements, homepages, and in many cases by contacting them via
phone or e-mail.
We only consider DSOs with at least 30,000 customers in our application as the DSOs below
this threshold are under a different regulation regime.11 There are also a few DSOs with slightly
more than 30,000 customers that are regulated in the different regime due to historical regulatory
excemptions. Those were excluded from our data. DSOs with more than 170,000 customers
were also disregarded to avoid too large structural differences between DSOs. Finally, 122 DSOs
remain in our sample. Out of the 122 DSOs, 46 have implemented legal unbundling, of which
seven have unbundled voluntarily. None of them has implemented ownership unbundling. 77
DSOs in our dataset did not unbundle at all during our observation period 2005–2014. Hence,
we observe (i) both states, legal unbundling and vertical integration for the 31 DSOs that
unbundled after 2005, (ii) only the state of vertical integration for the 77 DSOs that did not
unbundle at all, (iii) and only the state of legal unbundling for the 15 DSO that unbundled in
2005 or earlier. In Table 1 we provide more details on the distribution of the unbundling dates.
VIUs with more than 100.000 connected customers were required to incorporate legal un-
bundling according to Article 7 of the EnWG issued in 2005 (as outlined above). 20 of them
unbundled before 2007 (17 of them in either 2005 or 2006) and 20 in 2007 or 2008 (19 of them
in 2007) as shown in Table 1. Some utilities unbundled even later because they passed the
threshold of 100,000 connected customers, either through organic growth or following a merger,
and some even unbundled voluntarily.
11see Hellwig et al. (2018).
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Table 1: Timing of LU
Year 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2011 2013 no LU
LU of DSOs 2 1 12 5 19 1 3 3 77
The data on grid charges are composed of a fixed component and a variable part that depends
on the usage level. They are calculated for a representative residential household customer with
an annual consumption of 4,000 kWh of electricity. As a robustness check, we also compute
grid charges for an average business customer that consumes 50,000 kWh of electricity per year.
We also use information on the yearly maximum possible electricity generation capacity
(in kW) of the wind and solar plants connected to a DSO’s distribution grid. These two
variables are included to control for the additional time variation in costs imposed on DSOs by
the connection of renewable energy sources (RES). In general, these costs are created due to
the unreliable nature of RES and their expansion in recent years. More specifically, DSOs are
responsible for the stability of the electricity grid. However, the grid stability can be endangered
by grid congestions or voltage and frequency deviations. Therefore, DSOs need to use balancing
power to counteract frequency deviations and redispatch measures or feed-in management to
compensate grid congestions. As a result of the unpredictable nature of weather, an increase in
the connected solar and wind capacity increases the risk of grid instability and therefore raises
a DSO’s expenses for the mentioned countervailing measures.
Furthermore, the existing grid is not designed to handle the high amount of locally gener-
ated electricity that results from the expansion of RES. Before the expansion of RES, electricity
was typically received from a transmission system operator’s extra-high voltage trans-regional
transmission network and distributed by the responsible DSO in its grid area. However, the
share of renewable energies on Germany’s total electricity consumption increased from 15.1 per-
cent in 2008 to 31.6 percent in 2015 and more than 90 percent of renewable energy plants were
directly connected to the distribution grid in 2015.12 Therefore, not the whole amount of locally
generated electricity can be locally consumed and thus needs to be distributed from the genera-
tion facility to a TSO’s extra-high voltage transmission line. This creates additional investment
costs, since the existing grid needs to be expanded to secure grid stability. Finally, DSOs are
legally forced to connect newly built electricity plants under fair and objective conditions to
their distribution grid according to §20 of the German Energy Act. Thus, each newly built
12See the monitoring reports of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesnetzagentur,
2015, 2016).
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electricity plant creates additional investment costs if a grid expansion is needed to connect it.
We also include population density per distribution grid area and the number of meter points
(equivalent to the number of connected customers) into the set of control variables in order to
consider the network usage and the grid size, respectively.
Table 2 provides descriptive sample statistics of our main variables employed in the regres-
sions.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Grid charge (e/4,000 kWh) 208 32.7 105 320 832
Meter points (#) 75,222 39,838 31,017 167,080 832
Population density (#) 964 620 81 3,315 832
Solar capacity (kW) 17467 24,507 59 162,218 832
Wind capacity (kW) 7,907 18,911 0 133,217 832
5 Identification and Results
We are interested in the effect of legal unbundling of VIUs on their grid charges (in the following
simply prices). The suspicion is that VIUs may set higher prices in order to increase downstream
costs for their competitors at the retail level while the integrated enterprise itself can cross-
subsidize these costs. With legal unbundling this incentive should be mitigated by strengthening
the independence of the DSOs. Thus, we would expect that DSOs decrease their prices once
they are legally unbundled. If this is not the case, the VIUs either do not charge higher prices
at all or legal unbundling is not effective in incentivizing DSOs against discriminatory behavior.
As we observe several VIUs that underwent the transition from vertical integration to legal
unbundling during our period of investigation 2005–2014, we are able to perform a difference-
in-differences estimation. Formally, we estimate the following equation:
log(pit) = β×LUit + log(Xit)×γ + ξi + ξt + it, (1)
where pit represents the grid charges set by DSO i in year t. LUit is our variable of interest
and takes the value 1 if a firm i is legally unbundled in year t and 0 otherwise. X is a set of
(log-transformed) control variables, ξi and ξt are DSO and year fixed effects, and it represents
the noise term. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the DSO level.
An advantage of our data is that not all treated firms unbundled in the same year (see
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Table 1). This allows us to examine the effect for different control groups. The firms can be
categorized into three different types of firms depending on their timing of unbundling:
(a) LU after 2005
For these firms the transition from vertical integration to legal unbundling takes place
during our sample period. Hence, we observe their prices in years where they are still
vertically integrated and in years where they are legally unbundled.
(b) LU before 2006
These firms already unbundled before 2006. Hence, we do not observe pre-treatment
prices for these firms as our sample period ranges from 2005 to 2014.
(c) No LU
These firms did not legally unbundle at all during our sample period. For these firms we
only observe prices for the status of vertical integration.
Hence, we have (a) as the treatment group and two different potential control groups (b)
and (c).
For a causal interpretation of β in Equation 1 the parallel trend assumption must hold. It
requires that the developments of the prices of the treatment and the control group would have
been parallel in the absence of the treatment. However, it may be that VIUs that were obliged
to legally unbundle their operations already had a different trend in their pricing before un-
bundling was implemented. For instance, their prices may have experienced a stronger increase
or decrease, on average, than the prices of DSOs that were not forced to legally unbundle.13 In
this case, our estimates would be biased.
We can compare the pre-treatment development of prices of (a) with (c), but not with (b),
given that our data set starts in 2005. However, for (a) and (c), Figure 1 suggests that the
development of the prices of firms that unbundled and those that remained vertically integrated
is indeed parallel before the treatment.
13Recall that the VIUs that had to unbundle are larger (more han 100.000 customers) and hence, differ from
the VIUs that were allowed to remain vertically integrated in this regard.
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Figure 1: Pre-treatment development of prices of firms that unbundled and firms that did not
The firms that unbundled before 2006 account for one third of the unbundled firms (15 out
of 46, 12 of them unbundled in 2005). However, it is reasonable to assume that the unbundling
year was randomly chosen by these firms. In particular, we assume that firms that unbundled
in 2005 had the same development of prices before they legally unbundled as the VIUs that
unbdundled in 2006 or 2007. To add further confidence that this is the case, we compare if
firms that unbundled before 2006 differ systematically from those that unbundled afterwards in
their observable main characteristics: the number of connected customers (meter points), the
population density in the DSOs’ grid areas, and the installed wind and solar capacity per grid
area.
To test this, we conduct a two-sample t-test of equal means of these charactersitics. Table
3 shows the results. The null hypothesis of equal means for both groups cannot be rejected for
any of these characteristics, suggesting that the DSOs that unbundled before 2006 and those
that unbundled afterwards do not differ statistically in this regard. This suggests that firms
that unbundled before 2006 may also serve as a reasonable control group.14
14A further assumption is that the implementation of LU immediately translates into pricing. If this is not
the case, we would not find a effect in the first one or two years after the LU implementation. However, we think
it is realistic to assume that firms immediately adjust their pricing strategies once the link between the grid and
the retail activities is cut.
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Table 3: t-test of equal means in the year 2006 of DSOs that legally unbundled before 2006 or
after 2005
Mean SD t-test (p-value)
Meter points
LU before 2006 120,048 40,187
LU after 2005 100,748 41,728
0.24
Population density
LU before 2006 2,547 1,761
LU after 2005 3,461 1,241
0.19
Wind capacity
LU before 2006 8,168 11,957
LU after 2005 3,528 4,905
0.22
Solar capacity
LU before 2006 2,579 3,583
LU after 2005 4,158 7,211
0.48
Note: The H0 of the t-test is “means are equal for both groups (a) and
(b)”.
We now estimate Equation 1 for the different control groups. If both (b) and (c) are
appropriate control groups, the effect of LU on prices should be similar. We will initially focus
on the period 2005–2009. We do this to avoid that coincidental and potentially heterogeneous
effects of a switch from rate-of-return regulation to incentive based regulation in 2009 affects
our results. However, we will also consider the full period and explicitly account for this switch
of the price regulation regime later.
In the first subsample, we include only firms that unbundled before 2009 and exclude all
firms that unbundled after 2008 or not at all. Hence, the treatment group consists of the firms
that experienced a transition from vertical integration to legal unbundling between 2006 and
2008 and the control group of all firms that unbundled earlier 2006 (as we do not observe their
pre-treatment prices). For those firms we observe prices before and after LU was implemented.
The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 4 and suggest that LU caused a price decrease
of approximately 6.9%.15
In the second subsample, we only include firms that unbundled after 2005 or not at all. In
other words, we replace the control group. While before it consisted of firms that are legally
unbundled during the entire sample period, it now consists of firms that are vertically integrated
15To interpret the coefficients as percentage changes they are transformed to 100× exp(coefficient)− 1, in this
case exp(−0.072)− 1 = −0.069.
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during the entire sample period. The treatment group remains the same as before, namely firms
that unbundled during 2006–2008. The results are reported in Column (2) of Table 4. The effect
of LU is now 5.4% (= exp(−0.055) − 1) and hence, similar in magnitude to that reported in
Column 1.16 This adds further confidence that the estimated effect is not due to different
pre-treatment price developments.
Finally, we use the full sample of firms. The control group now consists of all firms that
remained either vertically integrated or are legally unbundled in all sample years. The results
are shown in Column (3) and suggest that LU causes an overall price reduction of around 5.9%
(= exp(−0.061)− 1).
Table 4: Estimating the effect of LU on different subsamples for the period 2005–2008
(1) (2) (3)
DSOs included in Sample: LU before 2009 No LU or All DSOs
LU after 2005
Dependent variable is log(price)
LU -0.072∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.026) (0.022)
log(meter points) -0.074 -0.205∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.035) (0.027)
log(population density) 0.028∗∗ 0.009 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
log(solar capacity) 0.104∗∗∗ 0.046 0.049∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
log(wind capacity) 0.082∗∗∗ -0.047 0.025
(0.015) (0.054) (0.036)
DSO FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82 171 208
Note: Standard errors clustered at the DSO level in parenthesis. Period of investigation
is restricted to 2005–2008 (i.e. before the regime switch from rate-of-return regulation to
incentive regulation). ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
5.1 Interaction of the status of vertical integration with price regulation
As mentioned before, we are also interested in how the effect of LU on prices depends on the
type of price regulation in place. To study this, we take advantage of a regulatory reform, which
took place in 2009 – a switch from rate-of-return regulation to incentive-based regulation (see
16We evaluate the difference between the estimated coefficients in Column 1 (βˆ(1)) and 2 (βˆ(2)) based on a
z-value: z = (βˆ(1)− βˆ(2))/
√
SE(βˆ(1))2 + SE(βˆ(2)) = (−0.072 + 0.055)/
√
(0.0362 − 0.0262) = −0.38 (Clogg et al.,
1995). The critical value for the 90% significance value is -1.96, so we cannot reject the H0 of equal coefficients.
Thus, the two estimated coefficients are statistically not distinguishable.
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Section 2). We therefore apply a triple-differences approach and estimate the following model:
log(pit) = β1×LUit + β2×LUit×IRt + log(Xit)×γ + ξi + ξt + it, (2)
where IR takes a value of 1 during the time of incentive regulation from 2009 on, and is 0 before
2009. As we now explicitly account for the regulatory reform, we can make use of the entire
observation period 2005–2014 in this regression.
The results from estimating Equation 2 are presented in Column (3) of Table 5. The effect
of LU is similar as before and suggests that LU causes a price decrease of 5.35% (=100×(exp(–
0.055)–1)) under rate-of-return regulation. Moreover, the estimate of the interaction term
LU×IR suggests that the switch from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation causes
an additional price decrease of 3.34% (=100×(exp(–0.034)–1)) for legally unbundled utilities
compared to vertically integrated ones. In sum, under incentive regulation, prices are 8.69%
lower for legally unbundled than for vertically integrated utilities.17 This suggests that the type
of price regulation indeed matters regarding the efficacy of LU and that the price effect of LU
comes particularly into play under incentive regulation.
In addition to the fixed-effects model, as given in equation (2), we also estimate a model in
which we replace the year fixed effects ξt by a yearly time trend (T ) and its squared term (T
2).
Although this specification may be less precise (i.e. time fixed effects are more flexible than
the polynomial time trend), it has the advantage that it additionally allows us to estimate the
effect of the introduction of the incentive regulation, which would otherwise be captured by the
year fixed effects:
log(pit) = β1×LUit + β3×IRt
+ log(Xit)×γ + δ1T + δ2T 2 + ξi + it.
(3)
The results are shown in Column (4) of Table 5 and are fully robust to the fixed-effects
results as in Column (3). We find a price decrease of 4.7% (=100×(exp(–0.048)–1)) following
the implementation of LU. Again, the parameter estimate for the interaction term LU×IR
suggests that under incentive regulation there is an additional price effect for legally unbundled
utilities in the magnitude of −3.44% (=100×(exp(–0.035)–1)) compared to firms that remained
vertically integrated. As all coefficients in Column (4) have similar magnitudes as the estimates
17The combined effect of LU and LU×IR is computed as 100×(exp(–0.055)-1 + exp(-0.034)-1)=–5.35+(–
3.34)=–8.69.
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in Column (3), the quadratic trend appears to mimic the year fixed effects reasonably.
Table 5: Estimating the effect of LU and IR for the period 2005–2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is log(price)
LU -0.078∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
IR 0.049∗∗∗
(0.010)
LU×IR -0.034∗∗ -0.035∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
log(meter points) -0.153∗∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.161∗∗ -0.155∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068)
log(population density) -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
log(solar capacity) 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
log(wind capacity) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DSO Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y N Y N
Time trend (T & T2) N Y N Y
Observations 760 760 760 760
Note: Standard errors clustered at the DSO level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
The estimates suggest that prices for vertically integrated firms are approximately 5%
(=100×(exp(0.049)–1)) higher under incentive regulation than under rate-of-return regulation.
In contrast, we do not find that the type of price regulation affects pricing of legally unbun-
dled firms as the combined effect of IR and LU×IR is only 1.58% (= (exp(−0.049) − 1 +
exp(−0.035)− 1)), and statistically insignificant.18 Hence, our estimates suggest that vertically
integrated firms increased their prices due to the switch from rate-of return regulation, while it
had no effect for legally unbundled firms.
We also estimate the models without consideration of the introduction of the regulatory
reform. The results are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. They suggest that without
consideration of the price regulation regime, legal unbundling reduces prices by approximately
8% compared to vertical integration.
A concern may be that grid charges are non-linear in consumption as they are two-part tariffs
18A t-test with the null hypothesis β2 + β3 = 0 gives a p-value of 0.39, indicating that the effect is not
distinguishable from zero.
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consisting of a fixed component and a per-unit charged component. To check the robustness of
the estimates we also estimated the specifications from Table 5 for business consumers with a
yearly electricity consumption of 50,000 kwh. The results are fully robust and are reported in
Appendix Table A1.
5.2 Endogeneity
There may be concerns about endogeneity. One issue is that seven firms in our dataset unbun-
dled voluntarily and hence self-selection into treatment may have an effect on our results. To
test this, we exclude the seven voluntarily unbundled DSOs from our dataset and estimate the
specifications from Table 5 again. The results stay robust as shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Estimation of the effect of LU and IR for the period 2005–2014 after exclusion of
voluntarily unbundled DSOs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is log(price)
LU -0.079∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
IR 0.049∗∗∗
(0.010)
LU×IR -0.027 -0.027
(0.017) (0.018)
log(meter points) -0.154∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.160∗∗ -0.154∗∗
(0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071)
log(population density) -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
log(solar capacity) 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
log(wind capacity) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
DSO Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y N Y N
Time trend (T & T2) N Y N Y
Observations 723 723 723 723
Note: Standard errors clustered at the DSO level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
Moreover, it is also possible that some VIUs may have sold parts of their grid prior to the
introduction of the legal unbundling regime in order to prevent mandatory legal unbundling.
Hence, excluding the voluntarily unbundled VIUs may not be sufficient to fully exclude potential
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bias due to endogeneity arising from self-selection into treatment. To address this concern
further, we apply the identification strategy recently proposed by Lewbel (2012, 2018).
Table 7: Lewbel (2012) IV estimation of the effect of LU and IR for the period 2005–2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is log(price)
LU -0.088∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
IR 0.052∗∗∗
(0.011)
LU×IR -0.038∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
log(meter points) -0.155∗∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.158∗∗
(0.073) (0.071) (0.068) (0.067)
log(population density) -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
log(solar capacity) 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.009
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
log(wind capacity) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DSO Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y N Y N
Time trend (T & T2) N Y N Y
First-stage Wald test for group 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
heteroskedasticity (p-val.)
First-stage F stat. 364.21 48.19 - -
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. - - 74.85 37.88
Critical value for weak instruments (10%) 11.52 11.12 11.06 10.89
by Stock and Yogo
Hansen J stat. (p-val.) 0.70 0.34 0.52 0.75
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.42 0.73 0.34 0.70
Observations 778 778 778 778
Note: Standard errors corrected for using generated instruments and clustered at the DSO level in
parenthesis. LU and IR × LU treated es endogenous and are instrumented using Lewbel’s (2012) het-
eroskedasticity based IV approach. Estimation is done by GMM. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
Lewbel (2012) provides an estimator for linear regression models containing an endogenous
regressor, when no outside instrument is available. In a nutshell, the method works by exploiting
the model heteroskedasticity to construct instruments using the available regressors. Lewbel
(2018) shows that the assumptions required for the proposed estimator can also be satisfied
when an endogenous regressor is binary, as is the case with our LU variable. The results of the
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Lewbel IV estimations are reported in Table 7.19
As Lewbel (2012) shows, the model is identified if the errors from a regression of the endoge-
nous variable on covariates from the main model are heteroskedastic and the variance of these
errors is correlated with at least some of the covariates but not with the covariances of these
errors and the second stage errors. We test the heteroskedasticity requirement based on the
residuals of the first stage regression, using a modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedas-
ticity. The test leads us to reject the null hypotheses of constant variance as can be seen in
Table 7. Table 7 also shows that the generated instruments are sufficiently strong to identify
the LU variables according to the First-Stage F-statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic
as the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values are always exceeded. The instruments are also
not correlated with the error term as shown by the Hansen J test. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test does not point towards an endogeneity issue as it does not reject the exogeneity hypothesis
of the unbundling introduction. Nevertheless, the results turn out to be consistent with the
estimations presented earlier, supporting our main results.
5.3 Placebo
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to exclude other possibilities that could drive our results.
As discussed earlier, an important assumption for the validity of our difference-in-differences
estimation is that prices in the treatment and the control group have a common trend in the
absence of LU. Since we have already shown that the effect of LU is similar for different control
groups, our estimated effect is unlikely to be caused by different trends.
Another common concern in difference-in-difference estimation is that the standard errors
may understate the standard deviation of the estimators due to serial correlation (Bertrand
et al., 2004). As with the previous concern, this concern is also unlikely in our case, because we
allow for arbitrary serial correlation by clustering standard errors at the utility level.
In any event, we formally examine this concern by randomly assigning a placebo LU year
to each utility that implemented LU during our sample period. We then run the specification
as given in Equation 2 and compare the resulting coefficients of the LU dummy with the actual
LU coefficient from Column (3) in Table 5. We repeat this procedure 1, 000 times. Figure
2 shows the distribution of the resulting placebo coefficients and their p-values. The placebo
coefficients are centered around zero (the mean is 0.003) and their p-values exceed 10% in 89.5%
19A technical description of the required assumptions for the Lewbel IV estimation and a brief description on
the procedure itself are provided in the Online Appendix.
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of the cases. Moreover, the p-values of the placebo coefficients exceed the true p-value of our
actual LU coefficient in 97.3% of the cases.20 This is very close to random chance and suggests
that our results are indeed not caused by a violation of the common trends assumption or by
autocorrelation.
Figure 2: Placebo results
The left panel presents distribution of the placebo coefficients (1,000 repetitions), the right panel the
distribution of the corresponding p-values. The red vertical lines present the values from the estimation in
Column (3) of Table 5. The Black solid line illustrates a normal distribution.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities is applied in many jurisdictions around the globe in
network industries such as energy, telecommunications, broadband internet, and railway trans-
portation. The idea of unbundling is to separate the natural monopoly (usually the network)
from other segments in the vertical supply chain, aiming at fostering competition and reducing
incentives to discriminate against competitors with third-party access to the network.
Despite the relevance of unbundling given its wide practical implementation, its actual
efficacy is still ambiguous and debated controversially. There is a consensus in the literature
that unbundling is associated with a loss of vertical scope economies, which is most pronounced
for full ownership unbundling. Also, the empirical literature on the deemed competitive effects
of unbundling is unfortunately scarce and has not identified a price decreasing effect on grid
charges or retail prices.
In this paper we analyze the effect of legal unbundling on grid charges using a panel dataset
of German electricity utilities, of which some underwent legal unbundling while others did not.
20The p-value of LU’s coefficient estimate from Column 3 in Table 5 is 0.017.
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Moreover, during our sample period 2005–2014, we observe a switch in the regulatory regime
from rate-of-return to incentive regulation which additionally enables us to identify the effect
of unbundling on grid charges under different price reguation regimes. Legal unbundling is the
standard requirement for unbundling in the energy sectors and is supposed to be a ‘golden mean’
between vertical integration and full ownership unbundling (Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz, 2011a,b). It is
considered to diminish vertical scope economies less than ownership unbundling but to similarly
reduce the incentives of the network operator to distort downstream competition. However, it
is particularly not clear if the latter effects actually translates into practice.
We find that legal unbundling is indeed successful in reducing grid charges by around 5%
to 9%, depending on the type of price regulation in place. While legally unbundled utilities
subject to rate-of-return regulation charge around 5% lower grid charges compared to VIU,
under incentive regulation the prices are even around 9% lower. Our findings are important
because we extend the relatively limited literature on the potential benefits of unbundling in
general and of legal unbundling in particular. Our findings alleviate the concerns of a broader
strand of literature (e.g. Arocena et al., 2012; Gugler et al., 2017; Triebs et al., 2016), which
finds that unbundling destroys scope economies, and we contrast previous empirical work that
does not find an effect of legal unbundling on distribution grid charges in Germany (Nikogosian
and Veith, 2012).
Fortunately, the combination of legal unbundling together with incentive regulation is ap-
plied widely in electricity and gas distribution markets in the EU Member States and the USA.
For other countries, such as Japan, that are about to follow this avenue, our results bear promis-
ing expectations. Another relevant issue is that in the EU, only the minority of relatively large
electricity and gas utilities with more than 100,000 customers are required to legally unbundle.
To benefit from the price effects of legal unbundling, policymakers may want to loosen this
stringency.
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Appendix
A Analysis for Business Customers
Table A1: Estimating the effect of LU and IR for the period 2006–2014:
Estimation for business customers with a yearly electricity consumption of 50,000 kWh
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is log(price)
LU -0.079∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.045∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
IR 0.055∗∗∗
(0.012)
LU×IR -0.043∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.019) (0.019)
log(meter points) -0.099 -0.095 -0.108 -0.103
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
log(population density) -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
solar capacity) 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.012
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
log(wind capacity) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DSO Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y N Y N
Time trend (T & T2) N Y N Y
Observations 764 764 764 764
Note: Standard errors clustered at the DSO level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
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B Technical description of Lewbel’s (2012) IV method
Consider the linear relationship Y = Xβ + Zγ + ε1, where Z is the potentially endogenous
variable (the LU dummy in our case) and γ is the parameter we wish to estimate. The equation
that determines Z is Z = Xα+ε2, where ε1 and ε2 may be correlated and no element of X can be
used as an instrument, i.e. there is no outside instrument available. As usual, the requirement is
that E (Xε1) = 0, E(Xiε2) = 0, and that E (XX
′) is nonsingular. The additional assumptions
for the identification in the absence of an outside instrument are that Cov (X, ε1ε2) = 0 and
that there is some heteroskedasticity in the error of the first-stage, Cov
(
X, ε22
) 6= 0. The
variation in ε2 can then be used to identify X. If these assumptions hold, γ (and β) can
be estimated consistently by using interactions of the mean-centered control variables and the
residuals (
(
X − X¯) εˆ2) to instrument for Z.
The estimation procedure is then as follows:
1. Estimate αˆ by an OLS regression of X on Z to obtain εˆ2 = Z −Xαˆ.
2. Use the interactions of the residuals εˆ2 and the mean-centered covariates (X − X¯) as
instruments for Z and estimate Z = Xα+γ
(
X − X¯) εˆ2+ε3.
3. Obtain βˆ and γˆ by estimating Y=Xβ+Zˆγ+ε4.
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